Can the Best-Alternative Justification Solve Hume's Problem? On the Limits of a Promising Approach

Philosophy of Science 77 (4):584-593 (2010)
Abstract
In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's. This comment examines the limitations of Schurz's approach. It can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With his limitation it remains doubtful whether the meta-inductivist can provide a full solution to the problem of induction.
Keywords Problem of Induction  Hume's Problem  Best Alternative Justification
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DOI 10.1086/656010
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