Ratio 21 (4):371-391 (2008)
This essay disputes G. A. Cohen's claim that John Rawls's argument for the difference principle involves an argument from moral arbitrariness to equality and then an illicit move away from equality. Moreover, the claim that an argument from moral arbitrariness establishes equality as the essential distributive justice ideal is found wanting.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Choices Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism Over Time.Patrick Tomlin - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):393-407.
Rawlsian Liberalism, Justice for the Worst Off, and the Limited Capacity of Political Institutions.Ben Cross - 2016 - Sophia 55 (2):215-236.
Luck Egalitarianism and What Valuing Responsibility Requires.Alexandra Couto - 2015 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-25.
Public Reason and the Exclusion of Oppressed Groups.Cross Ben - forthcoming - Dialogue:1-25.
Similar books and articles
Justice in General: An Introduction.Peter Vallentyne - 2003 - In Equality and Justice: Justice in General. Routledge.
Educational Equality Versus Educational Adequacy: A Critique of Anderson and Satz.Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):117-128.
Equality Does Not Entail Equality Across Species.Roger Fjellstrom - 2002 - Environmental Ethics 24 (4):339-352.
Egalitarianism, Ideals, and Cosmopolitan Justice.Gillian Brock - 2005 - Philosophical Forum 36 (1):1–30.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads203 ( #19,242 of 2,153,858 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #119,783 of 2,153,858 )
How can I increase my downloads?