Some Evidence is False

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172 (2013)
According to some philosophers who accept a propositional conception of evidence, someone's evidence includes a proposition only if it is true. I argue against this thesis by appealing to the possibility of knowledge from falsehood
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2011.637937
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References found in this work BETA
Peter D. Klein (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Ted A. Warfield (2005). Knowledge From Falsehood. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):405–416.

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Citations of this work BETA
Martin Montminy (2014). Knowledge Despite Falsehood. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
Bob Beddor (2015). Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.
Alexander Bird (2016). Evidence and Inference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).

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