Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172 (2013)
According to some philosophers who accept a propositional conception of evidence, someone's evidence includes a proposition only if it is true. I argue against this thesis by appealing to the possibility of knowledge from falsehood
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References found in this work BETA
Useful False Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
Williamson on Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.
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