The Common Cause Principle

The common cause principle states that correlations have prior common causes which screen off those correlations. I argue that the common cause principle is false in many circumstances, some of which are very general. I then suggest that more restricted versions of the common cause principle might hold, and I prove such a restricted version.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,453
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
James Robert Brown (1982). Realism, Miracles, and the Common Cause. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:98 - 106.
Elliott Sober (1984). Common Cause Explanation. Philosophy of Science 51 (2):212-241.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

21 ( #222,949 of 1,925,296 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #308,590 of 1,925,296 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.