The shape of Lockean rights: Fairness, pareto, moderation, and consent

Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (1):255-285 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In chapter four of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick raised interesting questions about whether or not it is ever morally acceptable to act against what are agreed to be an individual's natural moral rights. The pursuit of these questions opens up issues concerning the specific content of these individual rights. This essay explores Nozick's questions by posing examples and using our considered responses to them to specify the shape of individual rights. The exploration provisionally concludes that a conception of individual moral rights quite different from Nozick's looks attractive and merits further development. Footnotesa I thank Ellen Frankel Paul for helpful, constructive, and substantive comments on a prior draft of this essay. It goes without saying that her comments outstripped my ability to respond.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,623

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

152 (#126,782)

6 months
30 (#127,624)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard J. Arneson
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Justice and political authority in left-libertarianism.Fabian Wendt - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (3):316-339.
Libertarianism and Climate Change.Olle Torpman - 2016 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
A Lockean Theory of Climate Justice for Food Security.Akira Inoue - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (2):151-172.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Randian Argument.Robert Nozick - 1971 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):282.

Add more references