British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):255-259 (1989)
AbstractLarry Laudan has challenged the realist to come up with a program that submits realism to "those stringent empirical demands which the realist himself minimally insists on when appraising scientific theories." This paper shows how the realist can go about taking up Laudan on this challenge; and, in such a way that the realist hypothesis actually ends up being confirmed, by any empirical standards. In other words, it is shown that we can test for convergent realism, just as readily as Laudan can test for a connection between theories that are controlled by the cannons of science and their subsequent reliability
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Citations of this work
From Observability to Manipulability: Extending the Inductive Arguments for Realism.Rom Harré - 1996 - Synthese 108 (2):137 - 155.
'Courage Not Under Fire': Realism, Anti-Realism, and the Epistemological Virtues.Christopher Norris - 2001 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):269 – 290.
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