Philosophical Issues 15 (1):282–298 (2005)

Nomy Arpaly
Brown University
Many psychiatrists tell their clients that any mental disorder is ‘‘a disease, just like diabetes’’. This slogan appears to suggest that mental states and behavior that are classified ‘‘mental disorders’’ are somehow radically different from other mental states and behaviors—both when it comes to simply understanding people and when it comes to moral assessments of mental states and of actions. After all, mental illness is just like diabetes, while other human conditions are not. That sounds like a huge difference. I think this suggestion is misleading
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00067.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,231
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Psychosis and Intelligibility.Sofia Jeppsson - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (3):233-249.
Maladjustment.Michaela McSweeney - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.
On the Special Insult of Refusing Testimony.Allan Hazlett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):37-51.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
578 ( #14,865 of 2,518,494 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #88,402 of 2,518,494 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes