In Praise of Desire

New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Timothy Schroeder (2013)
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Abstract

Joining the debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. Acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue are simply acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good

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Author Profiles

Nomy Arpaly
Brown University
Timothy Schroeder
Rice University

Citations of this work

The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.
Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.

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