On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment

Nomy Arpaly

On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment

Ethics 110 (3):488-513 (2000)

Abstract	I argue that akrasia is not always significantly irrational. To be more precise, I argue that an agent is sometimes more rational for being akratic then she would have been for being enkratic or strong-willed.
Keywords	Rationality Akrasia Weakness of Will Davidson Irrationality Inverse Akrasia Practical Reasoning
Categories	Irrationality in Epistemology Weakness of Will in Philosophy of Action (categorize this paper)
DOI	10.1086/233321
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Citations of this work BETA

A Stronger Doctrine of Double Effect.Ben Bronner & Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.

The Enkratic Requirement.Allen Coates - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333.

Why Care About Being an Agent?Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):488-504.

The Evaluative Nature of the Folk Concepts of Weakness and Strength of Will.Paulo Sousa & Carlos Mauro - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):487-509.

E Xpressivism and E Pistemology: E Pistemology for E Cumenical E Xpressivists.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):83-108.

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Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
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