History of the Human Sciences 26 (5):27-30 (2013)

Abstract
In this article, cognitivism is understood as the view that the engine of human action is the intentional, dispositional, or other mental capacities of the brain or the mind. Cognitivism has been criticized for considering the essence of human action to reside in its alleged source in mental processes at the expense of the social surroundings of the action, criticism that has often been inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This article explores the logical extent of the critique of cognitivism, arguing that by positing collectively shared knowledge of criteria as the engine of human action many such critiques themselves display latent cognitivism.
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DOI 10.1177/0952695113513519
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Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Blackwell.

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The Extent of Cognitivism.V. P. J. Arponen - 2013 - History of the Human Sciences 26 (5):0952695113500778.

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