Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency

Oxford University Press (2002)
Abstract
Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
Keywords Ethics  Psychology and philosophy  Moral Worth  Huck Finn  Hucklberry Finn
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Reprint years 2003, 2005
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Call number BJ45.A76 2003
ISBN(s) 0195179765   0195152042   9780195179767   9780195152043
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A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Agency and Inner Freedom.Michael Garnett - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):3-23.
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.

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