Oxford University Press (2002)

Nomy Arpaly
Brown University
Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
Keywords Moral Psychology  Moral Worth  Huckleberry Finn  rationality  agency  autonomy  akrasia
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Reprint years 2003, 2004, 2005
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Call number BJ45.A76 2003
ISBN(s) 0195179765   0195152042   9780195179767   9780195152043
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The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.
Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
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Accidentally Doing the Right Thing.Zoe Johnson King - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):186-206.

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