Lowe on Locke's and Frege's Conceptions of Number

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (1):39-52 (2010)
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In his last book about Locke’s philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege’s arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative reading of Frege’s arguments throws light on Frege’s and Lowe’s different agendas. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences of number is presented, and Frege’s and Lowe’s views are confronted with it



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Agustin Arrieta Urtizberea
University of the Basque Country

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Locke.E. J. Lowe - 1993 - New York: Routledge.
Locke: Compatibilist event-causalist or libertarian substance-causalist? [REVIEW]E. J. Lowe - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):688–701.
Relative Identity and Cardinality.Patricia Blanchette - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):205 - 223.

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