Shared Intention and Reasons for Action

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623 (2015)
Authors
Caroline T. Arruda
University of Texas at El Paso
Abstract
Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny this claim. They entail that shared intention is possible only if the participating agents form their intentions on the grounds of genuinely rational considerations. Thus, they “over-rationalize,” as I call it, shared intention
Keywords Shared Intention  Reasons for Action  Common Knowledge  Michael Bratman  Margaret Gilbert
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DOI 10.1177/0048393115608945
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References found in this work BETA

Responsibility Incorporated.Philip Pettit - 2007 - Ethics 117 (2):171-201.
Shared Intention.Michael Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention.Michael Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.

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