Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623 (2015)

Authors
Caroline T. Arruda
University of Texas at El Paso
Abstract
Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny this claim. They entail that shared intention is possible only if the participating agents form their intentions on the grounds of genuinely rational considerations. Thus, they “over-rationalize,” as I call it, shared intention
Keywords Shared Intention  Reasons for Action  Common Knowledge  Michael Bratman  Margaret Gilbert
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1177/0048393115608945
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,700
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 48 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
Shared Intention and Personal Intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
'Shared Agency', Gilbert, and Deep Continuity.Thomas H. Smith - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):49-57.
Communication and Shared Information.Marija Jankovic - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):489-508.
Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
How Action Governs Intention.Nishi Shah - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-19.
“Some Remarks On Intention In Action”.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Studies in Social Justice:1-18.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-09-03

Total views
74 ( #139,558 of 2,432,315 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #214,406 of 2,432,315 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes