Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons

Mind and Language 33 (5):441-459 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Most views of agency take acting for reasons (whether explanatory or justifying) to be an important hallmark of the capacity for agency. The problem, however, is that the standard analysis of what it is to act in light of reasons is not sufficiently fine grained to accommodate what we will argue are the myriad types of ways that agents can do so. We suggest that a full account of acting for reasons must also recognize the relationship that agents have with their reasons. We focus on two types of relationships. The first is the traditional case, where agents act in light of reasons that they take to be their own and that they endorse. We describe this as possessing an Endorsement Relationship with one's reasons. A second way of relating to reasons is what we will describe as possessing a Directed Relationship with one's reasons. This includes cases in which agents' actions are the product of reasons but toward which agents do not have an Endorsement Relationship. The Endorsement Relationship is uncontroversial. In this paper, we defend the existence and importance of the Directed Relationship. We show that it is a genuine but overlooked way of relating to, and thereby acting for, reasons.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,446

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Qualia: They’re Not What They Seem.John Gibbons - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.
Reasons and impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
weighing reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2019 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reasons for and reasons against.Justin Snedegar - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):725-743.
Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.
Reason-based Value or Value-based Reasons?Sven Nyholm - 2006 - In Björn Haglund & Helge Malmgren (eds.), Kvantifikator För En Dag. Essays Dedicated to Dag Westerståhl on His Sixtieth Birthday. Philosophical Communications. pp. 193-202.
Reasons for action: Internal vs. external.Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Argumentation and the Force of Reasons.Robert C. Pinto - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (3):268-295.
Doxastic coercion.Benjamin McMyler - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):537-557.
Reasons, Values, Valuing: Teleology and Explanation.Meredith McFadden - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):23-44.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-05-21

Downloads
77 (#193,667)

6 months
6 (#198,304)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Caroline T. Arruda
Tulane University

Citations of this work

Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.
Animal Agency, Captivity, and Meaning.Nicolas Delon - 2018 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 25:127-146.
Can affordances be reasons?Tobias Starzak & Tobias Schlicht - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.
Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.

View all 56 references / Add more references