Intuitionistic epistemic logic

Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):266-298 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We outline an intuitionistic view of knowledge which maintains the original Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionism and is consistent with the well-known approach that intuitionistic knowledge be regarded as the result of verification. We argue that on this view coreflectionA→KAis valid and the factivity of knowledge holds in the formKA→ ¬¬A‘known propositions cannot be false’.We show that the traditional form of factivityKA→Ais a distinctly classical principle which, liketertium non datur A∨ ¬A, does not hold intuitionistically, but, along with the whole of classical epistemic logic, is intuitionistically valid in its double negation form ¬¬(KA¬A).Within the intuitionistic epistemic framework the knowability paradox is resolved in a constructive manner. We argue that this paradox is the result of an unwarranted classical reading of constructive principles and as such does not have the consequences for constructive foundations traditionally attributed it.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic, Kripke Models and Fitch’s Paradox.Carlo Proietti - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):877-900.
Negationless intuitionism.Enrico Martino - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (2):165-177.
Explicit provability and constructive semantics.Sergei N. Artemov - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):1-36.
Investigations into intuitionistic and other negations.Satoru Niki - 2022 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 28 (4):532-532.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-02-09

Downloads
53 (#309,508)

6 months
15 (#185,276)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sergei Artemov
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Neighborhood Semantics for Modal Logic.Eric Pacuit - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Frontiers of Conditional Logic.Yale Weiss - 2019 - Dissertation, The Graduate Center, City University of New York
Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic.Johan van Benthem - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):571-601.
Admissible rules for six intuitionistic modal logics.Iris van der Giessen - 2023 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 174 (4):103233.
Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic.Johan Benthem - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):571-601.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Meditations on First Philosophy.René Descartes - 1984 [1641] - Ann Arbor: Caravan Books. Edited by Stanley Tweyman.
Realism and reason.Hilary Putnam (ed.) - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Logical Investigations.Edmund Husserl & J. N. Findlay - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):384-398.
Realism and Reason.Hilary Putnam - 1977 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 50 (6):483-498.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (122):47-67.

View all 74 references / Add more references