Disputatio (37):265-281 (2013)

Authors
Marc Artiga
Universitat De València
Abstract
Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color realism-antirealism debate.
Keywords Misrepresentation  Naturalistic Theories of Mental Content  Mental Representation
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DOI 10.2478/disp-2013-0020
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Citations of this work BETA

Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation.Marc Artiga & Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):613-627.
Color.Barry Maund - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Rescuing Tracking Theories of Morality.Marc Artiga - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3357-3374.

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