Authors
Marc Artiga
Universitat De València
Abstract
Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls ?Infotel-semantics?), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better off than standard teleosemantics
Keywords Nicholas Shea  Mental content  Circularity  Infotelsemantics  Mental representation
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DOI 10.1080/09672559.2014.893003
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.

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