The Reality of Time Flow: Local Becoming in Modern Physics

Springer Verlag (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is commonly held that there is no place for the 'now’ in physics, and also that the passing of time is something subjective, having to do with the way reality is experienced but not with the way reality is. Indeed, the majority of modern theoretical physicists and philosophers of physics contend that the passing of time is incompatible with modern physical theory, and excluded in a fundamental description of physical reality. This book provides a forceful rebuttal of such claims. In successive chapters the author explains the historical precedents of the modern opposition to time flow, giving careful expositions of matters relevant to becoming in classical physics, the special and general theories of relativity, and quantum theory, without presupposing prior expertise in these subjects. Analysing the arguments of thinkers ranging from Aristotle, Russell, and Bergson to the proponents of quantum gravity, he contends that the passage of time, understood as a local becoming of events out of those in their past at varying rates, is not only compatible with the theories of modern physics, but implicit in them.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Chapters

Conclusion

Here I summarize the foregoing arguments and discuss their implications for our overall conception of time and its passing. The idea that we “experience” global nows and their passing, I have argued, is simply unfounded. Time flow is a local phenomenon: it is the becoming of events out of those in t... see more

Becoming in Quantum Theory

After discussing the historical origins of Quantum Theory and some of its main interpretational issues, I discuss the implications for our concept of time of the measurement problem, Heisenberg’s inequalities, Wheeler’s delayed choice experiment, the Many-Worlds Interpretation and Bell’s Theorem. On... see more

Time in General Relativity

I describe how Einstein constructed General Relativity, discussing the warping of spacetime, gravitational time dilation and the distortions of time near singularities. Contrary to Einstein’s aims, GR does not evidence a complete physical equivalence of reference frames, with time simply relative to... see more

Relativity and the Present

After a discussion of pre-relativistic conceptions of the present and the Doppler effect, I discuss various notions of the present in the light of the relativity of simultaneity of the Special Theory. Rejecting notions of the present as relative to the observer’s inertial frame, or as consisting onl... see more

Special Relativity and the Lapse of Time

I discuss the historical origins of the idea of the relativity of motion and Einstein’s and Minkowski’s seminal innovations. I then show how attempts to refute the objectivity of time lapse by appeal to relativity theory fail to recognize that time lapse is tracked by Minkowski’s proper time, which ... see more

Classical Physics and Becoming

In this chapter I argue that neither the time symmetry of the laws of Newtonian physics nor determinism entails the time symmetry of the order of becoming of events. The time-directionality of individual processes cannot be defined in terms of increasing entropy, nor does it depend on a global direc... see more

Modern Objections to Time’s Passage

Here I examine the issue of the spatialization of time, attempts to construe becoming in terms of a “moving now” or of changing relations to the ‘now’, and the “block universe” interpretations. I argue that McTaggart’s “A theory” and Russell’s rival “static” or “B theory” of time fail because they p... see more

The Problem of Time in Classical Philosophy

I begin by looking at the philosophical precedents for denying the passage of time, beginning with arguments reported by Aristotle, and ending with the arguments of McTaggart, Russell and Grünbaum. I show the fallaciousness of all these arguments, arguing that the reality of passage stands or falls ... see more

Introduction

In this chapter I explain my aims in the book, and outline the argument. Time is not itself a process that can flow at a certain rate, since this would require a further time against which to measure this rate. I am defending the reality of becoming in the sense that events and processes come into b... see more

Similar books and articles

McTaggart and modern physics.Bradley Monton - 2009 - Philosophia 38 (2):257-264.
The sense of temporal flow: a higher-order account.Thomas Sattig - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3041-3059.
Time, Temporality, and the Scientific Investigation of Reality.Joaquin Trujillo - 2014 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 6 (2):445-462.
The Notion of Quantum Time.Sergey Aityan - 2012 - Ontology Studies: Cuadernos de Ontología:303-328.
Relativity theory: What is reality? [REVIEW]Diederik Aerts - 1996 - Foundations of Physics 26 (12):1627-1644.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-02-02

Downloads
32 (#488,786)

6 months
11 (#225,837)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard T. W. Arthur
McMaster University

Citations of this work

Time.Bradley Dowden - 2023 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Relational Passage of Time.Matias Slavov - 2022 - New York: Routledge.
Time, Grounding, and Esoteric Metaphysics.Natalja Deng - 2023 - The Monist 106 (3):287-300.
The obsession with time in 1880s–1930s American-British philosophy.Emily Thomas - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (2):149-160.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references