Allen Buchanan has argued that a widely defended view of the nature of the state – the view that the state is a discretionary association for the mutual advantage of its members – must be rejected because it cannot adequately account for moral requirements of humanitarian intervention. This paper argues that Buchanan’s objection is unsuccessful,and moreover, that discretionary association theories can preserve an important distinction that Buchanan’s alternative approach to political legitimacy cannot: the distinction between “internal” legitimacy (a state’s ability to morally justify itself to its own members) and “external” legitimacy (a state’s ability to morally justify itself to humanity more broadly).
|Keywords||legitimacy contract political Rawls Locke humanitarian aid human rights association international|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Justification and Application: The Revival of the Rawls-Habermas Debate.J. Pedersen - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):399-432.
The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention.A. Buchanan - 1999 - Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1):71–87.
On the Value of Political Legitimacy.M. Coakley - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (4):345-369.
Legitimacy, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Institutions.M. Kahler - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (1):20-45.
Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law.Allen E. Buchanan - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Humanitarian Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty in International Law.Patrick Macklem - 2008 - Ethics and International Affairs 22 (4):369-393.
Rawls on Human Rights: A Review Essay. [REVIEW]Burleigh Wilkins - 2007 - Journal of Ethics 12 (1):105 - 122.
Reciprocal Legitimation: Reframing the Problem of International Legitimacy.A. Buchanan - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (1):5-19.
Added to index2009-06-02
Total downloads427 ( #5,161 of 2,157,997 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #89,427 of 2,157,997 )
How can I increase my downloads?