Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164 (2014)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
I argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse property, regardless of how one understands the nature of sparse properties. I then offer two new arguments against metaphysical substantivism that employ ideas involving recombination and truthmaking. First, I argue that there are no theoretically compelling reasons to posit the existence of a metaphysically substantive property of truth. Secondly, I argue that if we do posit the existence of such a property, then we end up with a view that is either contradictory or unmotivated. What we’re left with is a metaphysically deflationary account of the property of truth that fully respects the metaphysical ambitions of truthmaker theory, and that is consistent with both the view that truth is a deflated, explanatorily impotent concept and the view that truth is an explanatorily powerful concept.
|
Keywords | Truth Sparse and abundant properties Truthmakers Deflationary theory of truth Correspondence theory of truth |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2014 |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1007/s10670-013-9483-y |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
View all 91 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):109-131.
Deflationism About Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb, Daniel Stoljar & James Woodbridge - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.
View all 18 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Varieties of Deflationism.Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth.Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons - 2007 - In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 61--89.
Functionalism About Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Michael Horton & Ted Poston - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):13-27.
The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns.Glen Hoffmann - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
The Metaphysics of Mixed Inferences: Problems with Functionalist Accounts of Alethic Pluralism. [REVIEW]Timothy J. Nulty - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (2):153-162.
Truth as One(s) and Many: On Lynch's Alethic Functionalism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):213-230.
Truth and Multiple Realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth.Jamin Asay - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (4):423-443.
The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning.Kari Middleton - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
Truth-Bearers and Modesty.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):49–75.
Pragmatism and the Price of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2015 - In Steven Gross, Michael Williams & Nicholas Tebben (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 245-261.
Truth and Other Self-Effacing Properties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):577–586.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2013-03-04
Total views
761 ( #9,597 of 2,506,107 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #56,841 of 2,506,107 )
2013-03-04
Total views
761 ( #9,597 of 2,506,107 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #56,841 of 2,506,107 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads