Against Truth

Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164 (2014)
Authors
Jamin Asay
University of Hong Kong
Abstract
I argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse property, regardless of how one understands the nature of sparse properties. I then offer two new arguments against metaphysical substantivism that employ ideas involving recombination and truthmaking. First, I argue that there are no theoretically compelling reasons to posit the existence of a metaphysically substantive property of truth. Secondly, I argue that if we do posit the existence of such a property, then we end up with a view that is either contradictory or unmotivated. What we’re left with is a metaphysically deflationary account of the property of truth that fully respects the metaphysical ambitions of truthmaker theory, and that is consistent with both the view that truth is a deflated, explanatorily impotent concept and the view that truth is an explanatorily powerful concept
Keywords Truth  Sparse and abundant properties  Truthmakers  Deflationary theory of truth  Correspondence theory of truth
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9483-y
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

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Citations of this work BETA

TRUTH: A Concept Unlike Any Other.Jamin Asay - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:175-191.
What is Deflationism About Truth?Matti Eklund - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.

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