Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth

Philosophy of Science 76 (4):423-443 (2009)
Abstract
Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate what sort of account of truth and empirical adequacy the constructive empiricist must offer and then show why deflationists cannot uphold such an account.
Keywords Truth  Bas van Fraassen  Philosophy of Science  Deflationism  Constructive Empiricism
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DOI 10.1086/648064
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