Synthese 192 (3):679-699 (2015)

Jamin Asay
University of Hong Kong
One well known approach to the soritical paradoxes is epistemicism, the view that propositions involving vague notions have definite truth values, though it is impossible in principle to know what they are. Recently, Paul Horwich has extended this approach to the liar paradox, arguing that the liar proposition has a truth value, though it is impossible to know which one it is. The main virtue of the epistemicist approach is that it need not reject classical logic, and in particular the unrestricted acceptance of the principle of bivalence and law of excluded middle. Regardless of its success in solving the soritical paradoxes, the epistemicist approach faces a number of independent objections when it is applied to the liar paradox. I argue that the approach does not offer a satisfying, stable response to the paradoxes—not in general, and not for a minimalist about truth like Horwich.
Keywords epistemicism  liar paradox  truth  minimalism  deflationary truth  Paul Horwich
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0596-x
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Clarendon Press.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.

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Citations of this work BETA

This is Not an Instance of (E).Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1035–1063.
Three Questions for Minimalism.Keith Simmons - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1011-1034.

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