Theory and Psychology 28 (3):382-397 (2018)

Authors
Jamin Asay
University of Hong Kong
Abstract
In a recent paper, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any substantive property that unifies the class of truths, makes equally good sense of scientific practice as the correspondence theory, but at lesser theoretical cost. I also argue that the considerations Haig and Borsboom draw on are better thought of as issues relevant to realism, and thus separate from the theory of truth. I conclude that while they are correct to engage questions about what makes true the various claims that arise in psychological research, they may do so without saddling themselves with a correspondence theory.
Keywords truth  correspondence  deflationism  realism  truthmakers  psychology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Scientific Image.Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Truthmaking and Difference-Making.David K. Lewis - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):602–615.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism.James O. Young - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.
Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers.Jamin Asay - 2011 - Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Tarski and Primitivism About Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
Deflationist Truth is Substantial.Nicholas Unwin - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (3):257-266.
Truth.Wrenn Chase - 2014 - Polity.
Truth.Kenneth Richard Garrett - 1982 - Dissertation, Boston University Graduate School
Truth in Constructive Empiricism.Jamin Asay - 2007 - Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
For Keeping Truth in Truthmaking.Fraser MacBride - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):686-695.
Dosegljivost Resnice.A. Ule - 2004 - Znanstveni Inštitut Filozofske Fakultete.
Against Truth.Jamin Asay - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-11-23

Total views
276 ( #32,176 of 2,433,358 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #20,637 of 2,433,358 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes