Superficial Dispositionalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):635-653 (2010)
Abstract
Dispositional ascriptions do not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering factors may be poised to prevent the disposition from manifesting in its very stimulus conditions. Such factors are commonly called finks and masks. It is thought, however, that finks and masks cannot be intrinsic to the disposition bearer; if an intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain conditions, the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. I argue that we should accept intrinsic finks and masks if we think there are finks and masks at all, and also if we maintain that paradigmatic dispositions are intrinsic. This last point is particularly problematic for the claim that there cannot be intrinsic finks and masks, for if paradigmatic dispositions are not intrinsic then the central argument for the impossibility of intrinsic finks and masks is undermined
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DOI 10.1080/00048400903352892
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References found in this work BETA
Finkish Dispositions.David Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Dispositions and Conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
Dispositions and Antidotes.Alexander Bird - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.
Defining 'Intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.

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Citations of this work BETA
Dispositions and Interferences.Gabriele Contessa - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.
On Not Getting Out of Bed.Samuel Asarnow - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-28.
Can Opposing Dispositions Be Co-Instantiated?Sungho Choi - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):161 - 182.
Flat Intentions – Crazy Dispositions?Jens Gillessen - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):54-69.

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