The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology

Wittgenstein-Studien 10 (1):153-163 (2019)
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Abstract

In this paper I make the case for a feminist hinge epistemology in three steps. My first step is to explain hinge epistemologies as contemporary epistemologies that take Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty as their starting point. My second step is to make three criticisms of this literature as it currently stands. My third step is to introduce feminist epistemologies, which argue that social factors like race and gender affect what different people and groups justifiably believe, and argue that developing a feminist hinge epistemology is both plausible and desirable.

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Natalie Alana Ashton
University of Stirling

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