Undercutting Underdetermination‐Based Scepticism

Theoria 81 (4):333-354 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Duncan Pritchard, there are two kinds of radical sceptical problem; the closure-based problem, and the underdetermination-based problem. He argues that distinguishing these two problems leads to a set of desiderata for an anti-sceptical response, and that the way to meet all of these desiderata is by supplementing a form of Wittgensteinian contextualism with disjunctivist views about factivity. I agree that an adequate response should meet most of the initial desiderata Pritchard puts forward, and that some version of Wittgensteinian contextualism shows the most promise as a starting point for this, but I argue, contra Pritchard, that the addition of disjunctivism is unnecessary and potentially counter-productive. If we draw on lessons from Michael Williams's inferential contextualism then it is both possible, and preferable, to meet the most important of Pritchard's desiderata, undercutting both closure-based and underdetermination-based sceptical problems in a unified way, without the need to resort to disjunctivism

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Closure and Underdetermination Again.Ju Wang - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1129-1140.
Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism.Jochen Briesen - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.
Disjunctivism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
Radical scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
Neo-mooreanism versus contextualism.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):1-24.
Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-06-24

Downloads
739 (#22,113)

6 months
206 (#13,404)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Natalie Alana Ashton
University of Stirling

References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Epistemological disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 25 references / Add more references