Vagueness and revision sequences

Synthese 190 (6):953-974 (2013)
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Abstract

Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.

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10.1007/s11229-011-0052-0

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Conrad Asmus
Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

Citations of this work

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Solovay-type theorems for circular definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
The revision theory of truth.Philip Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
An introduction to modal logic.G. E. Hughes - 1968 - London,: Methuen. Edited by M. J. Cresswell.

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