Vagueness and revision sequences

Synthese 190 (6):953-974 (2013)
Abstract
Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.
Keywords Vagueness  Revision sequences  Revision theory of truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-0052-0
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References found in this work BETA
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.

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Citations of this work BETA
Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.

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