Vagueness and revision sequences

Synthese 190 (6):953-974 (2013)
Authors
Conrad Asmus
Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
Abstract
Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.
Keywords Vagueness  Revision sequences  Revision theory of truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-0052-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,865
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-9.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-29.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Revision Operators.P. D. Welch - 2003 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (2):689-711.
Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW]Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
What's in a Function?Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1996 - Synthese 107 (2):167 - 204.
A Paraconsistent Theory of Belief Revision.Edwin D. Mares - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246.
On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89:1-29.
Still Counterintuitive: A Reply to Kremer.Roy T. Cook - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):257–261.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-12-03

Total downloads
70 ( #93,304 of 2,293,801 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #252,839 of 2,293,801 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature