Synthese 190 (6):953-974 (2013)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.
|
| Keywords | Vagueness Revision sequences Revision theory of truth |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| ISBN(s) | |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-011-0052-0 |
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 20 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
View all 6 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set.P. D. Welch - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
Minimalists About Truth Can (and Should) Be Epistemicists, and It Helps If They Are Revision Theorists Too.Greg Restall - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.
Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory of Truth.Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.
Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW]Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
The Liar Speaks the Truth: A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth.Aladdin Mahmūd Yaqūb - 1993 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Theories Looking for Domains. Fact or Fiction? Reversing Structuralist Truth Approximation.Theo A. F. Kuipers - unknown
On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2011-12-03
Total views
85 ( #130,185 of 2,461,809 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #223,153 of 2,461,809 )
2011-12-03
Total views
85 ( #130,185 of 2,461,809 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #223,153 of 2,461,809 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
