Abstract

The dissertation argues that Bradley's moral philosophy is worthy of far more serious attention than the leading English-speaking philosophical traditions have, in this century, given it. It makes its case by revealing the depth and complexity of the positive moral philosophy presented in Ethical Studies, by revealing the relationship between the moral theory presented there and relevant metaphysical doctrines, and by arguing that some historically influential criticisms of the moral philosophy either fail to understand it or beg important questions. ;The first four chapters reveal an argument that is implicit in the positive side of Ethical Studies. In Ch. I certain conditions that Bradley believes must be met by an adequate moral theory are presented and explained. These conditions are not systematically presented by Bradley. They are scattered throughout Ethical Studies and are often discovered by examining the bases of his criticisms of hedonism, utilitarianism, Kantian formalism, etc. The second chapter presents and explains Bradley's abstract moral theory. It draws on Essays II and VII of Ethical Studies. Chapter III constructs an interpretation of Bradley's concrete moral theory. It draws on Essays V, VI, and VII. Chapter IV completes the argument implicit in the positive side of Bradley's moral philosophy by showing ways the concrete moral theory fills in the abstract theory and by outlining how the concrete theory satisfies the conditions of adequacy. Chapter V extends the positive argument by showing how relevant metaphysical doctrines confirm the concrete theory. Material for this is drawn mainly from Appearance and Reality, but Collected Essays is also used. Chapter VI reviews historically influential criticisms made by Sidgwick and inspired by Moore as well as potentially influential criticisms made by Wollheim. It argues that these criticisms are weak either because they are based on mistaken views of Bradley's moral philosophy or because they beg important questions