Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):95-98 (1989)

In this reply I consider David O’Connor’s article “A Variation on the Free Will Defense” in which he tries to show that natural evil is necessary for free will by showing that it is required for the possibility of “morally creditable free choice.” I argue that O’Connor’s reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in showing that humans can be moral without the property he calls “p.” that an altered understanding of what “morally creditable free choice” is would not help. and finally, that if God’s moral condition is fundamentally different than ours, it could not be used as an example of p being inessential for humans being moral
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil1989616
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Reply to O’Connor.Steven S. Aspenson - 1989 - Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):95-98.

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