Metaphilosophy 43 (3):204-220 (2012)

Authors
Axel Barceló
Institute Of Philosophy, Mexico
Abstract
The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral luck is very similar to one of the examples John MacFarlane uses to motivate the assessment sensitivity of epistemic modals, and in particular the assessment sensitivity of the auxiliary verb “might.” This means that, if Rosebury is right and we do not actually need moral luck to explain Williams's example, we may not need assessment sensitivity to account for the semantic behaviour of the epistemic modal verb “might” either
Keywords relativism  might  epistemic modals  epistemic modality  luck  assesment sensitivity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2012.01747.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Moral Luck.Bernard Williams - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 50:115-151.
Making Sense of Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.
Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):173-178.
Moral Luck and the Professions.Jeffrey Whitman - 2008 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 27 (1-4):35-54.
Moral Responsibility and "Moral Luck".Brian Rosebury - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):499-524.
Moral Luck Defended.Nathan Hanna - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):683-698.
Reply to Silcox on Moral Luck.Brian Rosebury - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (1):109-113.
Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise.John Greco - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366.
Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues.Guy Axtell - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 158--177.
Moral Luck and the Law.David Enoch - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54.
Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck.Mark Silcox - 2006 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-04-12

Total views
127 ( #80,418 of 2,433,270 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #21,849 of 2,433,270 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes