Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27 (2010)
Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain specificity is, based on the intuitive idea that a domain specific mechanism is restricted in the kind of information that it processes, and show that each fails at least one of those constraints.
|Keywords||Domain-specificity Cognitive modularity Central systems Information restrictions|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby (eds.) - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories.Ruth G. Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Dual Process Theories Versus Massive Modularity Hypotheses.Angeles Eraña - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):855-872.
Similar books and articles
Breaking the Law: Promoting Domain-Specificity in Chemical Education in the Context of Arguing About the Periodic Law. [REVIEW]Sibel Erduran - 2007 - Foundations of Chemistry 9 (3):247-263.
Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind.Philip Gerrans & Valerie E. Stone - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):121-141.
The Theory of Mind Module in Evolutionary Psychology.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (3):305-21.
Domain-Specificity in Folk Biology and Color Categorization: Modularity Versus Global Process.Robert E. MacLaury - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):582-583.
A Metamodule for Conceptual Integration: Language or Theory of Mind?Scott Atran - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):674-675.
Distinctively Human Thinking.Peter Carruthers - 1998 - In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 69.
Innateness and Domain-Specificity.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):191-210.
The Contribution of Domain Specificity in the Highly Modular Mind.Axel Barceló Aspeitia, Ángeles Eraña & Robert Stainton - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27.
Added to index2010-02-20
Total downloads42 ( #122,626 of 2,163,620 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #348,040 of 2,163,620 )
How can I increase my downloads?