Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (2):159-168 (1983)

Gary M. Atkinson
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota
In a recent Article Carla Kary attempts to show that there should be a significant moral difference between instances of killing and letting die. I shall maintain in Section I that Kary's argument is somewhat weakened by the failure to note an important ambiguity in the notion of killing a person. I shall also argue in Section II that a similar ambiguity affects the notion of letting someone die, and that the failure to note this latter ambiguity also weakens the position developed by Robert Coburn with regard to defective newborns. CiteULike Connotea What's this?
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DOI 10.1093/jmp/8.2.159
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Conceptual Clarity in Clinical Bioethical Analysis.J. Clint Parker - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (1):1-15.

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