International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):36-49 (2014)
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Abstract |
Contemporary discussions of skepticism often frame the skeptic's argument around an instance of the closure principle. Roughly, the closure principle states that if a subject knows p, and knows that p entails q, then the subject knows q. The main contention of this paper is that the closure argument for skepticism is defective. We explore several possible classifications of the defect. The closure argument might plausibly be classified as begging the question, as exhibiting transmission failure, or as structurally inefficient. Interestingly, perhaps, each of these has been proposed as the correct classification of Moore's proof of an external world.
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Keywords | closure principle Moore's proof radical skepticism transmission failure |
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Reprint years | 2014 |
DOI | 10.1163/22105700-03021102 |
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References found in this work BETA
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
View all 17 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
An Argument for External World Skepticism From the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):368-383.
Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios.Tim Kraft - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):269-295.
The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox.Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1269-1288.
View all 6 citations / Add more citations
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Contents.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press.
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