Synthese 194 (8):3021-3046 (2017)

Philip Atkins
Temple University
Suspended judgment poses a serious problem for Russellianism. In this paper I examine several possible solutions to this problem and argue that none of them is satisfactory. Then I sketch a new solution. According to this solution, suspended judgment should be understood as a sui generis propositional attitude. By this I mean that it cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, other propositional attitudes, such as belief. Since suspended judgment is sui generis in this sense, sentences that ascribe this attitude to someone should not be analyzed in terms of other attitude ascriptions, such as belief ascriptions. Instead they should be understood as involving a semantically primitive predicate, corresponding to the state of suspended judgment
Keywords Russellianism  Suspended judgment  Attitude ascriptions  Kaplan’s puzzle  Frege’s puzzle
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1089-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.
A Puzzle About Belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.

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Citations of this work BETA

Friedman on Suspended Judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.
Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.
Disagreement and Suspended Judgement.Filippo Ferrari - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):526-542.

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