How to confirm the disconfirmed. On conjunction fallacies and robust confirmation

Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21 (2009)
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Abstract

Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for nine different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.

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References found in this work

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.

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