Potential Being and the Source of Cosmic Order

This paper argues (a) that the concept of “potential being” is central to the theory and practice of contemporary cosmology and evolutionary science, and (b) that the reality of potential being points to the existence of an intelligent and purposive cause of the intelligible order among potential beings that existed from the first moments of the Big Bang. The paper introduces and explains the concept of “potential being” and then traces the existence of potential beings back to the beginnings of the cosmos at the instant of the Big Bang. This primeval existence of potential beings is shown to possess a character and order that points to a cause external to that order. The paper concludes with a consideration of the features that must be possessed by that external cause in order to make sense of what we know
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 0019-0365
DOI 10.5840/ipq200646321
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