Abstract
In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My objections centre around the claim that Parfit employs an impoverished conception of 'life'. Parfit misconceives the connection between 'I' and one's body, and, so, despite his rejection of a metaphysical conception of 'self', remains within the logic of Cartesianism. What Parfit and other reductionists call an 'impersonal' perspective, I shall call the third-person perspective: a perspective which one in general may take. Against Parfit I shall offer a more complex conception of 'self' through the concept of 'bodily perspective'. I emphasize the irreducible ambiguities of human embodiment in order to show the presuppositions and the limitations of Parfit's view. Of interest is the conception of time and the model of continuity that is appropriate to an embodied subject's life. I employ Paul Ricoeur's concept of 'human time' to argue that the reflective character of human experience demands a model of temporality and continuity that differs significantly from the one Parfit employs
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DOI 10.1080/096725500750039309
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References found in this work BETA

People and Their Bodies.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1997 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell.
Narrative Identity.Paul Ricoeur - 1991 - Philosophy Today 35 (1):73-81.
Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind.Robert B. Pippin - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):449 - 475.
Kant and Reductionism.Quassim Cassam - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 43 (1):72-106.
Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility.Martin Low‐Beer - 1991 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):217 – 236.

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Citations of this work BETA

Recombinant Identities: Biometrics and Narrative Bioethics.Btihaj Ajana - 2010 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 7 (2):237-258.
A Body Worth Having?E. Cohen - 2008 - Theory, Culture and Society 25 (3):103-129.
‘Lookism’, Common Schools, Respect and Democracy.Andrew Davis - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (4):811–827.
Ricoeur on Time: From Husserl to Augustine.Gert J. Malan - 2017 - Hts Theological Studies 73 (1).

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