Reichenbach's posits reposited

Erkenntnis 69 (1):93 - 108 (2008)
Abstract
Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under particular circumstances, Reichenbach’s approach and that of the Bayesians amount to the same thing, thereby presenting us with a new instance in which chance and credence coincide.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,334
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Foundations of Scientific Inference.Wesley C. Salmon - 1966 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
The Theory of Probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
Infinitism Regained.J. Peijnenburg - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):597-602.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
98 ( #58,502 of 2,225,156 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #181,126 of 2,225,156 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature