Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):581-606 (2021)

Authors
C. J. Atkinson
Lingnan University
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss whether different interpretations of the ‘aim’ of belief—both the teleological and normative interpretations—have the resources to explain certain descriptive and normative features of suspended belief (suspension). I argue that, despite the recent efforts of theorists to extend these theories to account for suspension, they ultimately fail. The implication is that we must either develop alternative theories of belief that can account for suspension, or we must abandon the assumption that these theories ought to be able to account for suspension. To close, I briefly consider some of the reasons we have in favour of pursing each of these options, and I suggest that it is worth exploring the possibility that suspension is best understood as its own attitude, independently of theories of belief’s ‘aim’.
Keywords Aim of Belief  Suspended Belief  Withheld Belief  Suspended Judgment  Aims  Norms
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Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2020.1870945
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References found in this work BETA

Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.

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