Unanswerable questions for everyone: reply to Inan

Philosophical Studies 161 (2):263-271 (2012)
Millianism is the familiar view that some expressions, such as proper names, contribute only their referent to the semantic content of sentences in which they occur. Inan (Philosophical Studies 2010) has recently argued that the Millian is committed to the following odd conclusion: There may be questions that he is able to grasp but that he cannot answer, either affirmatively, negatively, or with a simple I don’t know . The Millian is indeed committed to this conclusion. But we intend to show that Inan’s argument generalizes, so that everyone who accepts certain largely uncontroversial principles is committed to the odd conclusion that there may be questions that are graspable but not answerable.
Keywords Millianism  Belief  Frege’s puzzle  Kripke’s puzzle
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9733-2
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Saul A. Kripke (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.

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