What is it like to be a chinese room?

Abstract
When philosophers think about mental phenomena, they focus on several features of human experience: (1) the existence of consciousness, (2) the intentionality of mental states, that property by which beliefs, desires, anger, etc. are directed at, are about, or refer to objects and states of affairs, (3) subjectivity, characterized by my feeling my pains but not yours, by my experiencing the world and myself from my point of view and not yours, (4) mental causation, that thoughts and feelings have physical effects on the world: I decide to raise my arm and my arm rises. In a world described by theories of physics and chemistry, what place in that physical description do descriptions of the mental have?
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