Philosophia Mathematica 10 (2):203-226 (2002)

Authors
Mark van Atten
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
Brouwer and Weyl recognized that the intuitive continuum requires a mathematical analysis of a kind that set theory is not able to provide. As an alternative, Brouwer introduced choice sequences. We first describe the features of the intuitive continuum that prompted this development, focusing in particular on the flow of internal time as described in Husserl's phenomenology. Then we look at choice sequences and their logic. Finally, we investigate the differences between Brouwer and Weyl, and argue that Weyl's conception of choice sequences is defective on several counts.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/10.2.203
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