The shape of a global ethic

Philosophy and Social Criticism 32 (1):5-19 (2006)
A global ethic needs to be cosmopolitan in a sense which is explained; this excludes certain kinds of communitarian ethic. Contracttheories, Kantianism, basic-rights theories, Ross-type deontology and theories of virtue ethics are reviewed and found to encounter severe problems. Consequentialist theories, however, are found capable of coping with Williams’ objections, and practice-consequentialist theories capable of coping with right-making practices and with Lenman's unpredictability objection. Variants that exclude from consideration unintended consequences, the results of omissions, or impacts on possible people, or which prioritize average over total outcomes, fail to improve on the Total View, which is argued to overcome objections based on population numbers and on good procedures, but which needs to be biocentric in scope. Theories of this kind are capable of coping with global problems, while also favouring alliances between global citizens of diverse normative outlooks. Key Words: alienation • biocentric consequentialism • cosmopolitanism • global citizens • global ethic • global problems • overpopulation • practice-consequentialism • Total View • unpredictability.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0191453706059843
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,674
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

38 ( #125,496 of 1,903,042 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #446,009 of 1,903,042 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.