Mental causation: Sustaining and dynamic

In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1993)
Abstract
I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that since there are no laws linking (intentional) mental states to actions, those states cannot be genuine causes of action
Keywords Causation  Mental  Supervenience
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Citations of this work BETA
Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System.Alicia Juarrero - 1999 - Emergence: Complexity and Organization 2 (2):24-57.
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Motivation in Agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.
Moral Facts as Configuring Causes.Terence Cuneo - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.

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