Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44 (1998)
This paper outlines and defends a moderate intuitionism. The point of departure is the intuitionism of W. D. Ross (1930) in The Right and the Good, conceived as ethically pluralist and epistemologically rationalist. The paper articulates a conception of self-evidence – including mediate as well as immediate kinds – appropriate to a moderate intuitionism, explores some of the resources and varieties of that position, and considers some problems and prospects for a rationalist version of intuitionism. The final section addresses the issue of how best to conceive the nature and grounds of prima facie duty, the problem of whether intuitionism can adequately deal with conflicts of prima facie duties, and the question of how satisfactorily a moderate intuitionism can account for the epistemic status of moral judgments of overall duty and their connection with rational action
|Keywords||duty intuition particularism reason W.D. Ross self-evidence understanding|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence.Matthew S. Bedke - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.
Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics.Matthew S. Bedke - 1069-1083 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
Similar books and articles
Some Remarks on Robert Audi's the Good in the Right.Candace Vogler - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press.
Challenges to Audi's Ethical Intuitionism.Klemens Kappel - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):391-413.
Naturalism and the New Moral Intuitionism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:163-84.
Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.
On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism.Jonathan Smith - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75 - 88.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads389 ( #6,699 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #45,332 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?