Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97 (2010)
This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value.Robert Audi - 2004 - Princeton Up.
Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe.Robert N. Audi - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following.John McDowell - 1981 - In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. pp. 141--62.
Citations of this work BETA
The Significance of High-Level Content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
Science's Immunity to Moral Refutation.Alex Barber - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):633-653.
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