Authors
Paul R. Audi
University of Rochester
Abstract
According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. It therefore seems to provide a way around the causal exclusion problem. There is reason to doubt, however, that the subset account can achieve both tasks. The problem arises when we look closely at the relation between properties and causal powers, specifically, at the idea that properties confer powers on the things that have them. If realizers are to be ontically prior to what they realize, then we must regard the conferral of powers by properties as a substantive relation of determination. This relation of conferral is at the heart of a kind of exclusion problem, analogous to the familiar causal exclusion problem. I argue that the subset account cannot adequately answer this new exclusion problem, and is for that reason ill-suited to be the backbone of a non-reductive physicalism
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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Reprint years 2012
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00476.x
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References found in this work BETA

Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Realization Relations in Metaphysics.Umut Baysan - 2015 - Minds and Machines (3):1-14.
Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epiphenomenalism.William Robinson - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Free Will and Mental Quausation.Sara Bernstein & Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):310-331.

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