Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence

Noûs (forthcoming)
Paul R. Audi
University of Rochester
Objects partially resemble when they are alike in some way but not entirely alike. Partial resemblance, then, involves similarity in a respect. It has been observed that talk of “respects” appears to be thinly-veiled talk of properties. So some theorists take similarity in a respect to require property realism. I will go a step further and argue that similarity in intrinsic respects requires properties to be immanent in objects. For a property to be immanent in an object is roughly for it to be wholly present in that object. If two objects are intrinsically similar in one way but not another, there must be a difference between the two ways. And if the similarity is between the objects as they are in themselves, then this difference, too, must be within the objects. Partial intrinsic resemblance thus requires internal structure. Without it, there can be no distinctions between ways in which things are intrinsically alike and ways in which they aren't. I will argue, further, that distinctions between properties that transcend objects fail to account for the possibility of partial intrinsic resemblance.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/nous.12244
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,013
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required).Karen Bennett - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
Ramseyan Humility.David Lewis - 2009 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press. pp. 203-222.
A World of States of Affairs.John Heil & D. M. Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):115.
Extended Simples.Kris McDaniel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Nomological Resemblance.Robin Stenwall - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):31-46.
A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Austere Nominalism.Philip Goff - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43–54.
Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts.Alexander Bird - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):221–228.
Pictures and Properties.Ben Blumson - 2014 - In Resemblance and Representation. Open Book Publishers. pp. 179-198.
Representation and Resemblance.John B. Dilworth - 1980 - Philosophical Forum 12 (2):139.
Resemblance and Misrepresentation.Robert Hopkins - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):421-438.
Resemblance as a Principle of Representation in Descartes’ Philosophy.David Scott - 2010 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):483-512.
Hume on Spatial Properties.Jani Hakkarainen - 2015 - In Guigon Ghislain & Rodriguez-Pereyra Gonzalo (eds.), Nominalism About Properties: New Essays. Routledge. pp. 79-94.
Resemblance.Sam Cowling - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (4):e12401.


Added to PP index

Total views
28 ( #240,765 of 2,312,436 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #53,914 of 2,312,436 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature