The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality

Oxford University Press (2001)

Abstract

The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately. It sets out a comprehensive theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. In both domains, Audi explains how experience grounds rationality, delineates the structure of central elements, and attacks the egocentric conception of rationality. He establishes the rationality of altruism and thereby supports major moral principles. The concluding part describes the pluralism and relativity his conception of rationality accommodates and, taking the unified account of theoretical and practical rationality in that light, constructs a theory of global rationality--the overall rationality of persons. Rich in narrative examples, intriguing analogies, and intuitively appealing arguments, this beautifully crafted book will spur advances in ethics and epistemology as well in philosophy of mind and action and the theory of rationality itself.

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Author's Profile

Robert N. Audi
University of Notre Dame

Chapters

The Sources of Practical Reasons

This chapter considers whether practical reason is substantive or only instrumental. It examines egoism, in a normative form, as well as hedonism, for which pleasure and pain are the fundamental sources of practical reasons. The chapter also considers what metaphysical commitments a theory... see more

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Citations of this work

Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition.Zoe Jenkin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):251-298.
Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.
Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.
Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.

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