The Structure of Justification

Cambridge University Press (1993)

Abstract

This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as opposed to refuting skepticism. These contrasts are applied not only to rational belief, but to rational action and the rationality of desires and intentions. The overall position is a pluralist, moderately rationalistic, internalist theory of justification and a partly externalist conception of knowledge. However, by virtue of offering a theory of rationality as well as an account of knowledge and justified belief, it will interest philosophers of ethics, science, and the social sciences and teachers and students of epistemology.

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Robert N. Audi
University of Notre Dame

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Citations of this work

The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.
Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.

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